

BILDERBERG MEETINGS

MEGEVE, FRANCE

April 19, 20 and 21, 1974

NOTICE TO PARTICIPANTS

GENERAL INFORMATION

It is customary to observe certain conventions at all Bilderberg Conferences.

Irrespective of their official positions, all participants attend in a strictly personal capacity.

The meetings do not attempt to formulate policy or even reach conclusions, no resolutions are submitted for discussion or voted upon. The purpose of the debate is to present a comprehensive review of the problems on the Agenda, from which each participant is free to draw his own conclusions. It is hoped, however, that those who attend the meetings may be better equipped to use their influence to improve relations in the world.

Fruitful discussion requires an atmosphere of mutual trust so that participants can express themselves frankly. For this reason, the press and public are excluded and neither background papers nor speeches are published. Moreover, all correspondence concerning Bilderberg should be considered personal and confidential.

In the final report, which is circulated only to participants in the Bilderberg Meetings, opinions are summarized but speakers are not quoted by name. This report normally includes the names of all participants.

Participants who would prefer that their names be omitted are asked to inform the Secretariat accordingly.

The list of participants will be given to the Press before the Conference opens. If you object to the inclusion of your name in this list, please notify the Secretariat as soon as possible.

PLACE OF THE MEETING

The Meeting will be held at the Mont d'Arbois Hotel in Megève (France), approximately 70 km from Geneva.

The full address is:

Hôtel du Mont d'Arbois
74120 Megève
France
Telephone: (50) 21 25 03 & 21 03 58
Telex: 34085 F MTDARBOI
Cables: Mondarbois Megève

ACCOMMODATION

The Hotel is situated on the plateau of Mont d'Arbois, 3 km from the centre of Megève.

The hotel will be reserved exclusively for participants of the Meeting.

Rooms and meals with table wines or beer will be provided free to participants. All extras - drinks, telephone calls, transport other than from/to the Airports/Railway Station, laundry, pressing service etc. - will be at the participants' own expense. The hotel will undertake arrangements for all laundry and pressing service requirements. Taxis are available at the hotel.

In the event of participants being accompanied by members of their family or their staff, the latter can be accommodated at their own expense in other hotels in Megève. The Secretariat will assist with the necessary reservation arrangements. It is, however, essential that the Secretariat be informed well in advance of the additional accommodation required, as hotel rooms during this period are limited.

PROGRAM

Participants are requested to arrive the day before the Conference opens, i.e. Thursday April 18, so that the sessions can start on Friday April 19, at 9.30 a.m.

Sessions will be held every day, both in the morning and in the afternoon, at times to be announced at the end of the preceding session.

On Sunday, April 21, there will be a session from 9 a.m. to 12 a.m. The Chairman would very much appreciate it if participants would not leave before the end of the session.

If desired, participants may stay until Monday morning, provided early notice to that effect is given.

No evening dress is required. During April the temperature usually varies from 32° F (0° C) at night to 59° F (15° C) in the day time. It would be advisable to provide for extra warm clothing and suitable shoes in the event of snow or thaw.

LANGUAGES

The official languages of the Conference will be English and French, and all documents will be translated into these languages. Simultaneous interpretation into English and French will be provided during the sessions.

CURRENCY

Travellers' cheques can be cashed and foreign currency exchanged at the Mont d'Arbois Hotel.

TRANSPORT

Transport between Geneva Airport (65 km of which 25 km are on the Motorway), Sallanches Railway Station (15 km) and the Mont d'Arbois Hotel will be provided by the Secretariat. It should be noted that there is a small Airfield (length of runway 400m) at Megève for

private planes. Since the possibilities of transport are numerous and varied (air and rail), more precise details are at your disposition should you require them.

Participants are requested to arrange for their own transport and to inform the Secretariat as soon as possible of their travel arrangements on the enclosed card.

To facilitate identification, participants are requested to attach to their luggage the Bilderberg tags provided by the Secretariat. Should a participant fail to be met on arrival at Geneva Airport, he should proceed to the Information Desk.

In view of the distance and the number of cars available, an expeditious transport service can be assured only, if these requests are complied with.

SECRETARIAT OF THE MEETING

Prior to Monday, April 15, all correspondence and cables concerning the Meeting should be addressed to:

Bilderberg Meetings
Smidswater 1
Telephone: (70) 462121
The Hague, Netherlands
Cables: BILDERMEETINGS

and from Tuesday, April 16, to the end of the Conference to:

Bilderberg Meetings
c/o Hôtel du Mont d'Arbois
74120 Megève
France
Telephone: (50) 21 25 03 & 21 03 58
Telex: 34085 F MTDARBOI
Cables: Mondarbois Megève

BILDERBERG MEETINGS

ORDRE DU JOUR

Perspectives de l'Alliance Atlantique

A G E N D A

The Prospects for the Atlantic World

GENERAL RULES OF PROCEDURE

Participants are requested to speak no longer than five minutes at a time ; a timing device will be in operation. If you wish to speak longer, will you please consult either the Chairman or Mr. van der Beugel, or Mr. Johnson.

One-minute interventions are always permitted and those who wish to respond to a particular point right away are welcome even after the order of speakers has been established. Please raise your hand to signal the Chairman.

These one-minute interventions are often preferable to longer ones, as they are likely to make the discussion much more animated.

Writing down notes and reading them slowly is generally not a good procedure - it slows down a discussion, and normally everyone can make a better contribution by just jotting down a few major points and speaking freely.

Remember : this is a discussion group.

Everybody is expected to speak freely and without any reservation. No one is going to be quoted in the report of the meeting.

All participants are requested not to give any interviews about the discussions at any time during or after the meeting.

This is the only way to guarantee to all speakers their real freedom of speech.

BILDERBERG MEETINGS

APRIL 1974

PRATICAL INFORMATION

Main points	Conference-room and Dining-room on the ground floor. Secretary's office on the ground floor near conference room and in the basement. Travel agency at the Concierge's lodge on the ground floor, near the Reception.
Meals	Breakfast from 7.30 a.m. onwards, in the dining-room or in the bedrooms. Lunch (buffet) around 1 p.m. and Dinner around 8 p.m.
Meetings	First meeting at 9.30 a.m. on Friday April 19th.
Return travel	The participants are requested to fill in the attached formulary as soon as they arrive, and to give it in to the travel agency.
Mail	Please see the concierge .
Telegrams and Telex	Received and sent by the Reception
Newspapers	Newspaper stall in the main entrance, on the left.
Exchange	All operations in foreign exchange and travellers cheques are done at the Reception. Credit cards accepted : Eurocard, American Express, Diners'Club, Banque Rothschild.
Laundry and pressing	Please ring the housemaid before 9 a.m. Clothes are returned around 6 p.m. (closed on Sunday)
Hairdresser	Please see the concierge .
Sauna	The hotel sauna is open from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m. Please see the hostess on the ground floor.
Personal	Drinks, telegrams, telephone, etc... are charged to the participants (List of drinks attached). The participants are requested to sign for each drink. <u>Taxes and service charges are included.</u>

BILDERBERG MEETINGS

TARIF BAR

Francs Français

Apéritifs	6 à 11
Porto	8
Port-Sherry	
Drinks & cocktails	10 à 12
Whisky	8 à 15
Champagne 1/4	26
Cognac	10 à 16
Brandy	
Eaux Minérales	5
Mineral Waters	
Bières françaises	5
French beers	
Bières étrangères	6
Imported beers	
Jus de fruits	6
Fruit Juice	
Coca-cola, Schweppes, Gini, 1/4 Perrier . .	5
Café	3
Coffee	
Thé	4
Tea	

Taxes et service compris

Tax and service charge included

BILDERBERG MEETINGS

AVRIL 1974

APRIL 1974

PROGRAMME

VENDREDI 19 AVRIL - FRIDAY 19th APRIL

Session du matin Morning Session	9.30 - 12.45
Pause Coffee break	10.45 - 11.00
Déjeuner Buffet Lunch	13.00
Session de l'après-midi Afternoon Session	15.00 - 17.30
Apéritif Cocktails	
Diner Dinner	20.00

SAMEDI 20 AVRIL - SATURDAY 20th APRIL

Session du matin Morning Session	9.30 - 12.45
Pause Coffee break	10.45 - 11.00
Déjeuner Buffet Lunch	13.00
Session de l'après-midi Afternoon Session	15.00 - 17.30
Apéritif Cocktails	
Diner Dinner	20.00

DIMANCHE 21 AVRIL - SUNDAY 21st APRIL

Session Session	9.00 - 12 noon
Déjeuner Buffet Lunch	



THE HAGUE, February 1974
SMIDSWATER 1
TELEPHONE 46 21 21
TELEGRAMS BILDERMEETINGS

DISCUSSION GUIDANCE BY THE SECRETARIAT

THE PROSPECTS FOR EUROPEAN AMERICAN RELATIONS

(The following points do not pretend to be exhaustive)

A. ASSUMPTIONS AND FACTS OF THE PAST

(The fifties and the beginning of the sixties)

- 1) European unification would in a relatively short time create a single political and economic actor of major importance on the world scene.
- 2) It was considered an American interest to support that process with all means.
- 3) The U.K. would join the Communities. Politically this would imply a more stable "atlantic" orientation of the Communities.
- 4) The interest and policies of the U.S. and the United Europe would be roughly parallel and there did not seem to be any inconsistency between European unification and Atlantic cooperation.
- 5) The Alliance would be based on a "two-pillar" system, but it was taken for granted that it would be led by the U.S. from its position of predominant economic power and undisputed military superiority.
- 6) The international system was dominated by the adverse relationship between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R..
- 7) There was not yet an absolute military parity between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R..
NATO strategy was based on American nuclear superiority, substantial presence of American troops in Europe and a reasonable conventional defense effort of the other NATO partners.

British and French nuclear capabilities were to remain marginal.

The "two-pillar" concept of the Atlantic Alliance was not thought through in its possible military implications.

- 8) The framework for international economic relations would be liberal (GATT, Int. Monetary Fund, free trade, most favoured nation concept, fixed parities, predominance of the dollar, etc.,etc.).
- 9) These views were shared by the overwhelming majority of those who made and influenced policy.

B. THE PRESENT (what went wrong with the assumptions)

Re A1) While crises, as Jean Monnet once said, are the great federators, the oil crisis proved that this is not necessarily the case in Western Europe. A relatively small push revealed the true state of Europe and European unity. It revealed notably the contradiction between the persistent tendency of the member states to use Community membership to serve their separate national interests and their declared goal of creating a full European Union. The result exceeds the worst fears of even confirmed pessimists. The picture shows a mixture of disarray and impotence.

Re A2) and
Re A4) The disillusionment in the U.S. about European unity is ambivalent. On the one hand there is a great disappointment about the slowness and even the possible collapse of the European integration process.

On the other hand, there is a growing awareness that even if unity should be achieved, the interests and policies of the two sides of the Atlantic would not necessarily be identical ("we cannot be indifferent to the tendency to justify European identity as facilitating separateness from the U.S." the American Secretary of State said in London on December 12th 1973).

So the questions asked by policy minded people in the U.S. are first: "Will European unity be achieved? Will we have a partner?" And the second question is: "What will that partner do to our interests?".

These questions were muted in the fifties and a substantial part of the sixties.

On the European side, a similar ambivalence exists.

On the one hand, there are growing frustrations about the benign, or in some eyes, even non-benign neglect by the U.S. of its traditional partners (superpower condominium, August, 1971, announcement of the "Year of Europe" without sufficient consultation, etc.,etc.).

On the other hand, the Western European countries know that in matters of defense they are completely dependent on American power.

These two contradictory tendencies are combined with the frustration that after the Middle East crisis (both the war and the energy crisis) it became apparent that Western Europe with 40% of the world gold reserves, 30% of its foreign trade, 20% of its industrial product and 10% of its population, counted for precisely nothing in terms of political power.

In other words, the discrepancy between economic and political power is not conducive to a constructive relationship between Europe and the U.S..

Re A3) The U.K. has joined the Communities. In many matters and certainly in two important ones - the unwillingness to accept Community solutions and matters of foreign policy - the British attitude is closer to the French than to other members of the Community.

Re A5) One pillar (the European one) only exists in a very limited economic sense (customs union and agriculture) and not at all in other matters.

The leadership of the U.S. has been severely shaken, both in terms of acceptability in Europe and acceptability in the U.S.. Until the events of October, the predominant economic position of the U.S. appeared to have been gravely affected by its balance of payments problems.

All this aggravated the tension between political-military power of the U.S. and economic power of Europe.

Re A6) The cold-war consensus has disappeared. Today there exists a wider variety of opinions, ranging from: "to the U.S.S.R. detente means simply a smoke-screen behind which it prepares the same old policies: domination over Europe, separation between Europe and the U.S." to "the cold war is over, in reality the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. have become allies".

Re A7) For all practical purposes there is now military parity between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R..

The disappearance of American nuclear superiority created doubts on the other side of the Ocean about the nuclear commitment of the U.S. to NATO.

Grave doubts also exist on both sides of the Ocean about the possibility to maintain a substantial American conventional force in Europe.

Despite these twin doubts there has been no substantial increase in European defense effort. NATO strategy became blurred (role of tactical nuclear weapons etc.).

Re A8) Liberal trade policies are rapidly breaking down and in many instances only the words remain.

The introduction of power as a visible element in international economic relations predates the shift towards a scarcity economy.

Even before the October war one could observe:

- the decline of a universally accepted "law" in international economic relations, in part because of a decline of U.S. support, in part because the simple consensus which equalled welfare with efficient production was breaking down;
- hence the proliferation of quantitative restrictions, uni- or bi-laterally imposed, which began to evolve into a politically determined international division of labour ("voluntary restrictions"; U.S.-Canadian Auto agreement; Euro-Japanese agreements on shipbuilding and electronics; unilateral safeguard clauses);
- the growing insistence by governments to maintain within their borders a full range of activities, irrespective of comparative advantages (high and low technology industries);
- the export of economic problems through international and external monetary policies within a greatly weakened international monetary system.

All these tendencies have been strengthened and made quasi permanent by the dramatic introduction of production and price controls by OPEC.

Furthermore, there has been a grave underestimation of the possible conflict between further international trade liberalization and the efforts of the European Community to maintain its internal cohesion in the absence of any real development in other fields.

Re A9) There has been in both Europe and the U.S. a decline in the number and influence of those who accept the assumptions listed under A above.

c. QUESTIONS for DISCUSSION

(The following questions should also be seen in the light of recent events in the Middle East and the energy crisis, but certainly not exclusively so.)

1. What is a realistic assumption as to the process of European integration?
Are we faced with a total breakdown?
What are the causes of the present disarray, and is there any hope that we are witnessing an only temporary set-back?
This question should be mainly discussed in intra-European terms.
2. What is the character of detente?
Is there still a domestic and Western consensus on the nature of East-West relations?
Is there any substantial difference between the assessment of Soviet policy by the United States and the major European countries or between the major European powers? (France - Germany).
Is there any realistic possibility or scope for a European foreign policy?
3. The economic concept of the Western world was based on a neo-classical concept of the market and the hope-expectation of growth. Is this still a solid concept?
Is the protection of the welfare-state still compatible with the concept of free trade?
What will organized power (both economic and political) do to the liberal economic concept? (trade unions, multinationals, military-industrial)?
What will be the impact of inflation on the fabric of our societies?
Government intervention was already massive before the energy crisis. Will it be even more predominant after the crisis has passed?

Is massive national government intervention compatible with free trade (in the Communities and outside), or will a lack of harmonization between these national interventions inevitably lead to a collapse of the international economic order?

Are there substantial differences between the economic developments in Europe and in the United States?

4. What is the essence of present NATO strategy and how is it affected by the situation of parity between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.? What is the importance of the current rethinking of nuclear strategy in the U.S.? Is there any possibility or scope for a European defense capability?
5. Is there any meaningful relation possible between a loosely connected group of European nation-states and the United States? If we overestimated the dynamism of European integration, is it better to try to deal now with this factual situation than to think in terms of a two-pillar system, which might be totally unrealistic to the relevant future? If the two-pillar system is, however, a realistic concept, what constructive relation should then be established between Western Europe and the United States? Which are the areas in which we can, and in which we cannot, assume that European and American interests are identical, and how should we cope with the "non-identical" interests?
6. Will it be possible to develop a common energy policy for:
 - a) Europe and for
 - b) Europe, North America and Japan?What will be the consequences if we fail to do so? What about monetary policy and trade policy?